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TRUTH, INQUIRY, AND DEMOCRATIC  
AUTHORITY IN THE CLIMATE DEBATE
Philip Deen
On February 15, 2011, State Representative Joe Read introduced HB 549 to the Montana legislature. According to its title, it was: “An Act Stating Montana’s 
Position on Global Warming.” If passed, Montana’s position governing future 
policy or law would be that “(a) global warming is beneficial to the welfare and 
business climate of Montana; (b) reasonable amounts of carbon dioxide released 
into the atmosphere have no verifiable impacts on the environment; and (c) global 
warming is a natural occurrence and human activity has not accelerated it.” Read 
has openly admitted that he had not conferred with any scientists in drafting the 
bill and that he is motivated primarily by a belief that the federal government 
uses climate policy to gain revenue and consolidate power, even going so far as 
to manipulate federal grants to manufacture data: “If you follow the money, the 
science has been pushed toward where the money is coming from. The money is 
coming from the federal government. I believe global science is an ideal, not a 
true science. . . . As a citizen legislature, we are inclined to believe with the sun 
on our hands and our face, and we’re not seeing the global warming.”1 While the 
scientific community is said to be corrupted by wealth and politics, the judgment 
of the lay public is unimpeachable. Thankfully, the bill has since died in commit-
tee and has little chance of becoming state law. However, it remains fascinating 
as an attempt to legislate in violation of scientific truth.
 Though it is tempting to dismiss Representative Read’s bill as an amusing and 
marginal case, it is not an isolated one on either the state or national level. Read’s 
bill may have failed, but it represents a larger attempt to eliminate climate truths by 
legislative action. For example, in direct opposition to their own Coastal Resources 
Commission, North Carolina state lawmakers have attempted to deny predicted 
climate-change-related sea level rises by means of mere fiat. While many other 
states are preparing for 1- to 2-meter increases in the coming century, these law-
makers have sought to legislatively cap the rise at 15 inches for the sake of future 
state policy. When this effort failed, new legislation was introduced to weaken the 
requirements that commissioners have scientific expertise and be free of compro-
mising business interests.2 On April 7, 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives 
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voted along party lines to repeal the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 
regulatory authority regarding climate change.3 During the course of congressio-
nal debate, House Democrats introduced an amendment requiring legislators to 
accept the EPA’s finding that climate change is real and a threat to public health 
and welfare. And, again, scientists were dismissed as pursuing their own political 
agenda rather than serving the public. Ted Poe (R-TX) claimed: “E.P.A. is on a 
mission to destroy American industry. When regulators, especially regulators at 
the E.P.A., go to work, they get in a big room and sit around a conference table 
drinking their lattes and say, ‘Who can we regulate today?’ because that’s what 
regulators do. Regulators regulate, all on the so-called premise of protecting us 
from ourselves.”4 Looking to the future, Lamar Smith (R-TX) has introduced the 
High Quality Research Act, which would require that the findings of any research 
conducted with federal funding, which is a significant percentage, would have to 
receive committee approval from the House of Representatives.
 In the following, I will discuss a concern for both democratic philosophy and 
environmental activism: the problematic relation between truth and democracy 
present in political debates over climate change. In these cases of explicit re-
jection of empirical fact as the basis of sound public policy, there is a general 
question of the proper ground of democratic political authority. When these laws 
pass, are the people obliged to obey them? We have two basic, reasonable, and 
yet conflicting intuitions. Within a democracy, authority is rooted both in (1) the 
truth, and (2) popular consent. However, as the climate debate reveals, these are 
not necessarily aligned. Are citizens obliged to obey laws when they are based 
on only truth or popular consent alone?5
 I argue here that the answer to this question is not provided by a theoretical 
reconciliation of truth and consent, but a practical one. Laws have authority insofar 
as they approximate the will of an ideal experimental community, which entails 
the reconciliation of expert and lay communities. To defend this position, I first 
set out what I take to be the problem—the conflict of two intuitions regarding 
the source of democratic authority. Second, I propose a solution grounded in the 
pragmatist theory of truth and inquiry and argue that, from within a pragmatist 
model, the genuine conflict is not a theoretical one between truth and popular 
consent, but a practical one between expert and lay communities. Third, I defend 
this solution by recalling Walter Lippmann’s famed criticism of democracy’s 
epistemic limits. Lastly, I will present the practical implications of a pragmatist 
model of truth and democratic authority for the development of climate policy.6
1. Political Institutions in Tension
The relation between truth and democratic authority is problematic because 
of the co-existence of two competing yet reasonable intuitions: For political 
authority to be normatively binding, it must be grounded in (1) the consent of 
s__
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the people, and (2) the truth. However, it is not necessarily the case that what 
is the outcome of public consensus and what is true are the same thing. In this 
section, I argue that each intuition is correct but neither is sufficient by itself to 
ground democratic authority.
 It is etymologically true that democratic authority rests with the people. Within 
liberal democracy, all citizens are presumed to be free, equal, and deserving 
of respect. Given that, the exercise of coercive authority must be justifiable, in 
principle if not in fact, to the people affected by the law. In those cases where 
the law expresses the will of the people, that is, where there are no egregious 
distortions introduced into the process of collective will-formation by monied 
interests, propaganda, or violence, or where there are no violations of basic rights 
and liberties, then all citizens are obliged to obey or be sanctioned. Though this 
has long roots in the liberal political tradition, this procedural model of legitimacy 
has particular favor in the wake of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism and delib-
erative models of democracy that hold that political legitimacy is not grounded 
in substantive metaphysical or moral commitments, but only in the procedures 
of public justification. Put more simply, if the law passed fairly, then I have to 
recognize it as legitimate, even if I believe it to be based in untruths. Were a bill 
to be passed defining climate change as a non-human process, then I may work 
to have that law repealed, but it is the law of the land. Given that climate policy 
affects the democratic public and climate research is often funded by the public, 
there is a prima facie obligation to obey the will of the public, even in the techni-
cal field of climate science.
 However, this counters the basic intuition that I am not obliged to obey a 
law that is out of touch with reality. We intuitively hold that participants must 
abide by minimal epistemic requirements if their position is to be considered. 
For example, were my fellow citizens to support a law resting on false beliefs 
regarding climate change, I would not feel legitimately bound to change school 
science curricula. Were I a high school earth sciences teacher, I might obey out 
of fear of unemployment, but I would not feel normatively obliged. Following 
this intuition, many democratic theorists have rebelled against Rawls’s “epistemic 
ambivalence,” holding that truth matters to democracy both as a substantive end 
of democratic politics and as a requirement that its procedures be epistemically 
sound.7 Simple fairness of procedure is not sufficient for political authority. The 
people could decide that flipping a coin or rolling dice—unbiased means of making 
decisions—may be the most fair way of determining policy, but that would not 
seem to ground their authority to coerce citizens. We tend to believe that power 
alone, even if it is power arising from popular consent, does not define the good, 
irrespective of truth. A certain degree of epistemic authority would seem to be 
necessary, perhaps even sufficient.
 Therefore, our second competing intuition is that political authority is, in some 
way, grounded in the truth. For example, were the Montana or North Carolina 
__s
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legislatures or Congress to determine that public policy must proceed as if climate 
change is anthropogenic or the theory of evolution is scientific truth, and if they 
are in fact true, then that law is legitimately binding insofar as it relies on facts. 
Correlatively, I would not be obliged to obey any law that contravened those 
facts. A democrat is repulsed by the claim that African Americans and women 
are intrinsically morally and intellectually inferior not only because it violates the 
minimal conditions for deliberation over the future of the democratic order, nor 
only because it violates deeply held democratic values such as tolerance, equality, 
and mutual respect, but also because the claim is simply false. However, as I will 
now argue, truth alone is also an insufficient ground for democratic authority.
 The scientific community holds anthropogenic climate change to be a fact. 
Countless scientific studies and dozens of scientific societies have concluded 
that climate change exists, that humanity is responsible, and that it has serious 
moral and environmental consequences. Though scientists differ over details and 
there are some outliers who doubt the consensus, the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science’s open letter on the matter is clear:
As you consider climate change legislation, we, as leaders of scientific organi-
zations, write to state the consensus scientific view. Observations throughout 
the world make it clear that climate change is occurring, and rigorous scientific 
research demonstrates that the greenhouse gases emitted by human activities 
are the primary driver. These conclusions are based on multiple independent 
lines of evidence, and contrary assertions are inconsistent with an objective 
assessment of the vast body of peer-reviewed science.8
 The eighteen signatories include the American Meteorological Society, Ameri-
can Chemical Society, and American Geophysical Union, each of which has 
written their own statements affirming the fact of anthropogenic climate change. 
In addition to scientific societies spanning all relevant areas of study, dozens of 
national and international academies of science have reached the same conclusion, 
and it is almost universally accepted in climatological research.9 Naomi Oreskes’s 
survey of all peer-reviewed abstracts on global climate change between 1993 and 
2003 found that not one disputed that climate change is happening and that it has 
been caused by humanity.10 Among experts, there is no fundamental controversy.
 Though scientific consensus must always be open to revision, and there is 
always the possibility that it is incorrect, there is compelling reason to accept 
the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change as true. One may be a 
fallibilist and yet confidently assert truths. For the sake of the present argument, 
then, let us proceed on the assumption that anthropogenic climate change is a 
fact and statements denying its existence are false.
 It is tempting to dismiss State Representative Joe Read and other climate 
change denying politicians as being out of touch with their own constituents, akin 
to representatives who oppose gun control while their constituents poll firmly s__
n__
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on the other side. One may claim that elected officials are out of touch with the 
truth, but the democratic public is not and there is no general problem. However, 
this will not work for the climate debate. First, for practical purposes of law and 
science policy, the representatives act as the public. Second, the public does not 
align with climate scientists. Third, even if the public did accord with truth on 
the climate debate, we could turn to evolutionary theory, and the problem would 
arise again.
 While there may be broad consensus within the scientific community, there is 
not consensus among the lay public. According to one Gallup poll, an increas-
ing percentage of Americans believe that claims regarding climate change have 
been greatly exaggerated: from a consistent 30–33 percent from 1998 to 2007 
to a sharp rise to 48 percent in 2010. There has been a corresponding decline 
since 2008 of those who believe that climate change will have serious effects or 
that it is caused by humans. Most interesting for the present argument, there has 
been a sharp decline—65 percent to 52 percent—of Americans who believe that 
the existence of anthropogenic climate change is scientific consensus. Rather, 
they are shifting to the belief that scientists are themselves unsure, despite the 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.11
 Given that most Americans have no direct knowledge of climate science, it is 
not surprising that they would be unaware of the scientific consensus. But such 
a clear shift is curious, as it is not as if direct knowledge of climate science was 
common prior to 2008 and suddenly declined. What is more likely is that changing 
public opinion reflects non-scientific factors such as political partisanship. This 
hypothesis was borne out by the University of New Hampshire’s Carsey Insti-
tute’s study of the link between political affiliation and belief in climate change. 
Ironically, the size of the political divide was directly linked to the respondent’s 
perceived level of expertise. Among those who did not claim to be well-informed 
on the matter, 23 percent of Republicans and 52 percent of Democrats believed 
that climate change exists and is caused by humanity. Among those who did claim 
to be well-informed, the divide increased to 19 percent and 78 percent.12 Increase 
of partisanship, increase of ignorance, and increase of perceived expertise among 
Republican respondents likely reflect the effects of ideologically narrow exposure 
to news media and political messages. Even more brazenly, political operatives 
such as Frank Luntz have openly tried to undercut the public’s awareness of 
scientific consensus: “Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues 
are settled, their views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, 
you need to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue.”13 
Though, to be fair, increased correctness among Democrats is likely because of 
partisanship and a similarly narrow filter—though, in this case, one coincident 
with scientific consensus. Such partisanship and ignorance of scientific fact 
is magnified when media conglomerates make explicit policy to deny climate __s
__n
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change, or wealthy individuals spend vast amounts to support think tanks to do 
the same.14
 Given that popular consensus is not a sufficient basis for political authority and 
that there is a wide gap between popular belief and scientific fact that is influenced 
by sheer political ideology, it is tempting to make truth the sole basis of political 
authority and turn climate policy over to climate scientists alone. However, this 
horn of the dilemma has its own problems.
 As noted above, the importance of truth to democracy is a prominent topic in 
contemporary political theory. Much of this debate has centered on the essen-
tially deliberative quality of democracy, that democratic outcomes arise from the 
exchange of reasons in an inclusive and egalitarian process of argumentation.15 
Democracy, it is argued, uniquely possesses normatively justified procedures. 
The justification of democracy is then interwoven with its aptitude to produce 
right outcomes. Democracy is epistemically justified, as it is the best procedure 
for producing knowledge or truth. Since democratic principles of inclusion and 
deliberation increase the probability of achieving a correct outcome, democratic 
authority is uniquely justified.16
 Variants of the epistemic justification of democracy have arisen in pragmatist 
political theory. As pragmatism draws a direct connection between truth and 
processes of public and experimental inquiry, pragmatist defenders of democracy 
have argued that (1) democracy is the only political form that mirrors the epis-
temically superior methods of experimental science and, therefore, it is uniquely 
truth-apt;17 and (2) democratic norms are quasi-transcendentally justified as the 
conditions for the possibility of reasonably asserting beliefs as true.18 In each 
case, the internal link between truth and public justification provides the norma-
tive ground for democracy.
 However, the epistemic justification of democracy has encountered the frequent 
objection that, if truth-aptness is the basis of political legitimacy, then there may 
be non-democratic procedures that are even better suited to attain true outcomes. 
This concern has led some to narrow the scope of the epistemic justification to the 
claim that while deliberative models of democracy are epistemically superior to 
other democratic models, democracy-as-such is justified either entirely or in part 
by its other, intrinsic values such as self-governance or preservation of liberty.19 
To make truth not only a necessary condition, but also a sufficient condition for 
political authority summons up Allan Bloom’s fear of Plato’s proto-totalitarian 
philosopher-kings who alone claim truth that gives them the authority to rule 
over others. Even if the philosopher-kings were actually in possession of the 
truth, our democratic intuitions are offended by their rule because (a) political 
authorities have a prima facie obligation to get the citizen’s consent, and (b) in a 
liberal democracy that values control over one’s private life, people are allowed 
to lived ignorantly. Of course, one could deny that ignorant citizens are not being s__
n__
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reasonable, and there might be some merit to that claim, but it is not obvious 
that there is no room for reasonable disagreement on the truth. In sum, while it 
might be more likely to produce true outcomes, it would offend our democratic 
intuitions to turn climate policy over entirely to climate scientists.
 For the purposes of this argument, let us assume that both truth and democratic 
self-governance are goods and it is better to harmonize them than to eliminate 
either. The ideal is to abandon neither the instrumental-epistemic value of 
democratic procedures (correctness of decision making) nor their other value (self-
determination, preservation of natural liberties, etc.), though concrete cases may 
require compromise or trade-offs. Any laws designed to address anthropogenic 
climate change are then politically problematic, as they must avoid two extremes. 
We are left with the problem of the legitimacy of laws that may (a) be derived 
from the democratic process and expressive of popular belief but are based on 
falsehoods, or (b) reflect scientific consensus but do not satisfy the requirement 
that democratic laws reflect the popular will.
2. Reconciling Truth and Consent in Theory
To overcome that abstract tension between truth and popular consent, I propose 
that we turn to the account of truth and inquiry found in American philosophical 
pragmatism.20 Historically, philosophical pragmatism has attempted to circumvent 
entrenched philosophical dualisms rather than solve them on their own terms. 
The pragmatists’ response when pulled between competing ideals is to structure 
institutions or processes so that ideals are harmonized. It is a concrete issue of 
reconstructing situations to harmonize desired ends, not an abstract issue of rec-
onciling or subordinating concepts. Practical or moral judgment is not complete 
until the situation creating the original tension is itself reconstructed, properly 
eventuating in new habits of action. Within a pragmatist theory of inquiry, the 
tension between the normative bases of democratic legitimacy is reconciled in 
theory because the conditions necessary for good inquiry are the same as those 
that secure both truth and consent. Insofar as political and scientific institutions 
and political decision-making processes provide the conditions for good inquiry, 
they alleviate the tension between truth and popular consent.21 The issue of practi-
cal reconciliation is deferred until the final section.
 A sketch of the pragmatist theory of truth is necessary. From its inception, 
the pragmatist theory of truth has been maligned as the assertion that the true is 
simply that which works—“works” understood to mean that which is satisfactory 
or allows a person to get what he wants. Hence, Bertrand Russell’s objection that 
no amount of personal satisfaction is going to make “the present king of France 
is bald” true. However, pragmatism actually understands truth as the outcome of 
an ideal inquiry. Charles Peirce defined the truth as “[t]he opinion which is fated __s
__n
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to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, 
and the objected represented in this opinion is the real.”22 This was reformulated 
by William James as
“[t]he true,” to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, 
just as “the right” is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedi-
ent in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of 
course. . . . The “absolutely” true, meaning no farther [sic] experience will 
ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine that all of 
our temporary truths will some day converge.23
 John Dewey also elaborated upon Peirce, citing his account of truth as the limit 
concept of inquiry as informing Dewey’s own notion of “warranted assertability,” 
which replaced “truth.”24 To some, the idea that truth is “fated” is too troubling. 
Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, cited above, have removed the teleological 
element and defined truth as that opinion which defeats all objections. Even in 
this last case, the pragmatist holds that the truth is not simply sitting “out there” 
to be discovered, but is in part “made” by the process of inquiry, of exposing a 
belief to public scrutiny and experimentation.
 Inquiry entails a community of those who inquire. The more inquirers intro-
ducing hypotheses and testing them against experience, assuming that they use 
the self-correcting methods of science, the more reliable the outcomes. Any 
community of inquiry that excludes legitimate sources of evidence or ignores 
the outcomes of tests because they upset traditional beliefs or social divisions 
would not be able to claim that its conclusions are true. It is then impossible for 
the pragmatists to have held that the true is that which is merely satisfactory or 
pleasing to some individual or finite community. Truth is a function of inquiry. 
To assert truth is to assert that the belief would be found true under the ideal 
conditions of an undistorted community of inquiry inclusive of all evidence and 
participants and extended over an indefinite amount of time. It is not what “works” 
for an individual. Truths are both the most warranted beliefs we have as the result 
of previous inquiry and relatively stable platforms for future action. The true is 
that which has been shown fruitful for future conduct.
 With this brief sketch in hand, let us return to the issue of democratic authority. 
Misak and Talisse, among others, have argued that there are implicit democratic 
norms built into the pragmatist model of truth and inquiry. Anyone who asserts true 
beliefs inevitably commits himself to defending those beliefs against reasons and 
evidence in an ongoing, inclusive, evidence-based, and respectful debate. Among 
all of the pragmatists, and most clearly in the work of John Dewey, scientific and 
democratic practice are isomorphic. A democratic public engages in the same 
sort of reflective, inclusive, experimental, and self-correcting enterprise as the 
scientific community, though with regard to broader problems, broader sets of 
relevant ideals, and different tests.s__
n__
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 This appeal to an ideal community of inquiry accounts for the tension we may 
feel between our respect for popular consent and truth. Following the model of 
the ideal experimental community, the legitimacy of public policy is dependent on 
whether that policy is the outcome of an inclusive and experimental community. 
Because inquiry extends indefinitely, the outcome of any democratic delibera-
tion is always provisional, as is any truth-claim. However, there is a difference 
between present policy outcomes and the regulative ideal to be found once the 
last man has had his say, the answer “fated” to be agreed upon. One could as-
sert that the present deliberative outcome arose from fair procedures and yet is 
still untrue because one can claim that a more inclusive or extended inquiry will 
reveal the present untruth/injustice. One may say: “Your position may have won 
in a fair debate, but I believe the debate will eventually swing my way. In the 
meantime, I have to obey laws based on the best answer we currently have.” The 
dissenting pragmatist citizen affirms not only that the current policy is expressive 
of a reasonable popular will, but also that it will be proven false in the course of 
a future, more ideal inquiry.
 There is an implicit norm of political reasonableness. Unreasonableness is not 
in appealing to thick beliefs about what is true or good—as some liberal concep-
tions of political public reason argue—but in the infallibilism of those who have 
not tied their concept of truth to public processes of inquiry. There is a significant 
difference between asserting that legitimate political authority rests on a revealed 
dogmatic truth and asserting that political authority is legitimate because, at this 
point and extrapolated from the best evidence and reasons, its judgments are 
correct. Of course, even the dogmatic believer holds that his dogma is fated to be 
agreed upon by those who would but recognize it. However, they have severed its 
intrinsic connection to an actual ongoing inquiry. So long as those with whom I 
disagree are sincerely open to reasons and evidence, their objections are reason-
able. I may believe they are wrong, but not that they are unreasonable. However, 
I am simultaneously committed to the belief that my position will eventually win 
out, given ideal conditions (or, at least, that my position is one of an exclusive 
set of reasonable truth candidates, while theirs is not).
 From within a pragmatist model of truth and inquiry, there is no conceptual 
tension between the authority of the truth and that of the people. The true is the 
consensus of the public, assuming that the public follows the methods of good 
inquiry, which entail an inclusive community extended over indefinite time. 
Rather, the tension between truth and popular consent is reconstructed as that 
between well-ordered, evidence-based, inclusive, and self-reflective communi-
ties of inquiry and inchoate, blind, exclusive, and unreflective ones. Put crudely, 
the tension is between communities of experts and non-experts. In the case of 
climate change, it is between climate scientists and other relatively informed and 
principled inquirers, and the general public who may be ideologically blinkered __s
__n
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or, through no fault of their own, simply ignorant. However, as we will see in the 
next section, this does not entail that we should hand all responsibility for public 
policy to expert communities.
3. Revising the Dewey-Lippmann Debate
Arguably, this reformulation of the tension between truth and consent of the gov-
erned does not address the underlying concern—when deciding on public policy, 
particularly as it depends on scientific knowledge, we are ill-served by putting it 
in the hands of the blinkered or ignorant. One could argue that the public would 
be better served by leaving political decisions in the hands of the scientific com-
munity, which is alone capable of attaining truth. This argument was made by 
Walter Lippmann in his famed dispute with John Dewey in the 1920s. Lippmann, 
a journalist and former student of William James, was a rising pragmatist and 
Progressive, but he lost hope in the wake of World War I that the people would be 
able to take an active and informed role in their own governance.25 He is uniquely 
positioned to offer an epistocratic critique of the present pragmatist argument.
 Lippmann contended that the people can never know the truth because they 
cannot have direct experience of the great majority of issues they would be called 
upon as citizens to judge. Due to the simple limits of human cognition and experi-
ence, the public is unable to approximate the scientific community. They are left 
within a pseudo-environment mediated by stereotypes. As a consequence, it is 
impossible for the masses to assert truths relevant to public policy. The reconcili-
ation of truth and politics is to be found only among the technocrats. Only those 
with technical expertise are in a position to make informed judgments about what 
is in the best interest of the whole, and this class of political scientists must advise 
those in political power, or exercise that power directly. The inchoate community 
of citizens simply cannot form a coherent, scientifically rigorous, public, and 
self-reflective community of inquiry. Truth and the “democratic” public may be 
reconciled only among elites.
 Given that, truth is attainable only among the elite, and it is by virtue of this 
truth (and the public good that results from possessing it) that they have political 
authority. These elites have the task of using publicly held stereotypes or symbols 
to direct the masses to desire policies rooted in the truth. Experts manufacture 
agreement from the diverse and conflicting images of the world found in the 
popular mind. As for the masses, they can function at best as a plebiscite recall-
ing one set of political elites found to be unsatisfactory and replacing them with 
another. Their ability to confirm or deny the truth of public policy is crude and 
indirect, not subtle or participatory. Hence, it is difficult to call this a democracy 
in any robust sense. However, given the fact that the public is unable to articulate 
itself and to know the truth, it is better that social scientists and their kind direct 
the masses than leave them to economic elites pursuing private advantage to 
s__
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the detriment of the whole. Lippmann’s technocracy may not be democratic in 
procedure, but it does pursue the good of the demos.
 Dewey replied to Lippmann’s The Phantom Public and Public Opinion by 
writing The Public and Its Problems. We need not discuss the details, but the 
central argument was that Lippmann is correct in his critique of contemporary 
democratic practice, but incorrect in the conclusions he draws. Dewey wholeheart-
edly agreed that the American public then (as now) was distracted, ignorant, and 
more interested in trivia than the problems affecting the public at large. However, 
he deeply disagreed with Lippmann’s conclusions that the public was inherently 
incapable of either articulating its will or proposing and testing policies designed 
to resolve public problems and that the public would be better served by handing 
political authority over to the technocratic elite.
 First, Dewey argued, the inability of the masses to articulate themselves into 
publics was a matter of contingent conditions, not of human nature. Lippmann’s 
critique, Dewey charged, was not of democracy as such, but of the present simu-
lacrum governed by commercial interests. The problem of forming a Public aware 
of its needs and capable of organizing itself to address them was a contingent one 
of communication. As means of communication improve, the public is better able 
to understand the extended consequences of action and become aware of their 
common needs. For example, insofar as we are able to see the phenomenon of 
climate change on a global scale, we are better able to see it as a common concern 
and something in need of common action. Dewey denied that we are condemned 
to pseudo-environments comprised of symbols manipulated by political elites 
or newsmen like Lippmann. Admittedly, Dewey’s own attempt to establish a 
newspaper dedicated to the sharing of unbiased data of public import—Thought 
News—was an unmitigated failure. Nevertheless, the task is to develop superior 
means by which the public could articulate itself as something like a scientific 
community. He had not given up hope that such means were possible.
 Dewey distinguished between raw and effective intelligence. Citizens may lack 
the raw, inborn intelligence required for omnicompetent citizenship. However, 
to use his example, the present-day shade-tree mechanic has nothing of Isaac 
Newton’s raw intelligence, yet he has practical knowledge of automobiles that far 
outstrips Newton’s. The mechanic’s culture embodies vast technical knowledge, 
providing the average person with an effective intelligence wrought by communi-
cation. “A more intelligent state of social affairs, one more informed by knowledge, 
more directed by intelligence, would not improve original endowments one whit, 
but it would raise the level upon which the intelligence of all operates.”26 Intel-
ligence is a social product and, given different social conditions, different levels of 
effective intelligence will result. Dewey argued, and one could easily argue today, 
that we are in dire need of improved social intelligence. Among the conditions 
for such improvement are the cultivation of the methods of inquiry and publicity 
of information. Dewey identified barriers to inquiry and publicity in 1927 that 
__s
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are familiar today: de jure intellectual freedom lacking de facto institutional 
support, superficiality and sensationalism, advertising, propaganda, nationalism, 
the sanctity of custom, academic specialization, and, perhaps fundamentally, the 
application of the results of scientific intelligence to human affairs from outside, 
but without making human affairs themselves more intelligent.27
 For Lippmann, the failure of democracy was a matter of philosophical an-
thropology, of human nature and its epistemological limits. For Dewey, it was 
a matter for critical social theory, of institutions and their ability to cultivate 
communication and inquiry. Whether it is possible to overcome the seemingly 
inborn limits of human cognition by means of communication and inquiry has 
not been truly tested, as such a test would require first instituting the conditions 
of inquiry that are so far sorely lacking. Which side is correct can be determined 
only experimentally and only after good inquiry has become customary. “Until 
secrecy, bias, misrepresentation, and propaganda as well as sheer ignorance 
are replaced by inquiry and publicity, we have no way of telling how apt for 
judgment of social policies the existing intelligence of the masses may be.”28 
Dewey then argued the counterfactual that were inquiry to become a matter of 
public life, then public intelligence would certainly rise and the resolution of 
public problems would be more likely. However, the safer point is simply that 
the experiment has not yet been conducted and, therefore, the results cannot be 
known. In an experiment, one varies the independent variable to see the conse-
quence for the dependent one. In this case, the level of institutionalized inquiry 
and communication must be varied to see the result for public intelligence. 
Lippmann had not taken that step. Ironically, his defense of the scientific elite 
depended on bad scientific method.
 Second, and more damning, the elitist-epistemic argument fails on its own 
terms. Dewey denied that handing over political authority to well-formed com-
munities of elite inquirers would succeed in attaining truth for two reasons. One, 
when elites are sequestered from the general public, they have a tendency, often 
unwitting, to take their own concerns as those of the public. Insofar as the narrow, 
scientific community of inquiry does not share in the larger public and inchoate 
one, it loses the ability to articulate public problems. Two, though the scientific 
method includes procedures to root out unreflective groupthink, communities of 
experts are still vulnerable to it. Elite communities of inquiry require the feedback 
that only the wider public can provide to know if their policies are working. To 
use Dewey’s metaphor, the public may not know how to fashion a shoe, but they 
know when it pinches. A community of elites cut off from the broader public 
therefore faces difficulties both identifying problems and measuring the success 
of their proposed solutions, two critical elements of scientific experimentation.
 James Bohman extends Dewey’s pragmatist argument that the scientific com-
munity, if it is to have knowledge, must include and deliberate with non-elites.29 
The tests to be conducted in the regulation and improvement of public life are 
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so wide in scope, and the methods to be used so open to dispute, that a narrow 
community of inquirers is unable to perform them. Given the limitations of what 
is possible within the model of elite control, democracy is better understood as 
a process of cooperative inquiry. The relation between scientific expertise and 
political decision making “is mediated by the larger public who tests both values 
and ends in light of available techniques and also techniques and strategies in 
light of shared interests, norms, and values,” which, in turn, “requires extensive 
and reciprocal communication between experts and the wider public.”30 Absent 
popular, democratic engagement in public policy, specifically regarding judgments 
of the credibility of experts and the terms of negotiation between experts and 
non-experts, we may not assert that the conclusions of the community of expert 
inquirers are the truth.31
 Technocratic or epistocratic governance therefore offends not only our 
democratic intuition that all deserve some share in governance, but also the 
truth intuition. Recall that within the pragmatist model of inquiry, a community 
of inquiry that excludes potential sources of hypotheses and experimental feed-
back weakens its claim to truth. The community of inquiry must be maximally 
inclusive. Experts who cut themselves off from public input (or non-expert ex-
perimentation) undercut their status as truth-holders and thereby their own claim 
to political authority. Admittedly, some do have expertise in good inquiry, and 
should be prima facie trusted, but their inquiries must be open to revision in light 
of non-experts’ experience. If political authority rests on epistemic superiority, 
and epistemic superiority relies on democratic participation, then the epistocrat 
loses authority over the public as they distance themselves from it.32
 In sum, the tension is not between popular consent and truth as the basis of 
democratic authority, but between publics that are relatively distracted, ideologi-
cal, and blind, and those that are not. Dewey understood the fundamental task to 
be that of transforming our presently muddled citizenry into a democratic com-
munity of inquiry. This cannot be done by investing experts with political power 
and isolating them from the broader public, but only by instituting the methods 
of scientific inquiry more broadly.
4. Reconciling Truth and Consent in Practice
With that in mind, let us return to the original question. That question is whether 
citizens have an obligation to acknowledge the authority of laws like those de-
nying the truth of climate change. The provisional answer has been to turn the 
abstract issue of the conceptual relation between truth and popular consent into 
a practical one of integrating expert and lay communities. Pragmatist political 
theory is then committed less to resolving the question of determining the abstract 
conditions of legitimacy than in making present political practice approximate an 
ideal inquiry—and therefore reach more legitimate outcomes. The unification of 
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public policy and truth functions as a regulative ideal in political practice rather 
than a problem for political philosophers.
 Let us then turn to some consequences of the pragmatist model. First, this analysis 
accords with our intuition that there is something fundamentally absurd in trying 
to legislate with disregard for scientific fact, as in the case of the Montana state 
legislature. Truthful laws must be the outcome of an ideal community of inquiry, 
not the fiat of a political body or the inarticulate intuition of how the sun feels on 
one’s face. If anything, the politicization of science is an attempt to shut down 
inquiry in the interest of tenacity, ideology, or self-interest. Second, if the public 
is to become a more ideal community of inquiry, then elite communities must be 
brought into contact with the general public and public discussion must be given 
scientific-democratic structure. For example, scientific inquiry must be protected 
from political interference, but, at the same time, scientifically grounded public 
policy must be subject to peer-review boards. There should also be public distribu-
tion of proposed regulations and public forums for objection and discussion.
 There have been many experiments in democratic deliberation between experts 
and non-experts relevant to the climate debate. James Bohman, in the account 
summarized above, describes the way in which AIDS treatment was improved by 
drawing on the expertise of patients. And patient participation was not simply in-
formative, but challenged epistemic norms and the expert model of how knowledge 
is produced.33 Further experiments in deliberative governance have been tried in 
public land use in western Colorado; health and education policy in São Paolo, 
Brazil; and waterfront urban design in Philadelphia.34 On the international level, 
Robert Goodin and Steven Ratner have proposed Global Citizens’ Juries as an 
attempt to introduce a deliberative, democratic element to the determination of 
jus cogens, the “higher” moral law that limits the exercise of states.35
 Specifically, there have been fledgling attempts to develop wider democratic 
deliberation on climate change. On the small scale, deliberative polling on cli-
mate policy and the university was conducted at Carnegie Mellon University in 
2008 and 2009. Deliberative polls are a well-known attempt by James Fishkin 
of Stanford University’s Center for Deliberative Democracy to overcome the 
inherent informational and reflective weakness of the standard poll by providing 
background information, time to respectfully discuss the topic with other par-
ticipants, and opportunities to question experts in the relevant field.36 These polls 
resulted in higher levels of concern regarding the issue and calls for Carnegie 
Mellon to adopt energy-efficient policies, develop curricula, and support envi-
ronmental research. On a larger scale, World Wide Views on Global Warming, 
a citizens’ deliberation group based in Denmark, gathered four thousand people 
from thirty-eight countries in 2009 for a deliberative poll on the concurrent UN 
climate policy meeting in Copenhagen. The result was nine policy recommenda-
tions to reduce emissions and strengthen international cooperation.37 Similarly, 
Europolis’s “Deliberative Polity-Making Project” was a successful deliberative 
poll on immigration, the European Union, and climate change.38
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 Of course, deliberative polling is not the same as robust citizen participation 
on environmental policy decision making, but it is a step toward that goal. The 
development of a culture of public inquiry—meaning both the cultivation of good 
inquiry among the public and the incorporation of publicity into expert commu-
nities of inquiry—is an enormous task, and it would be prudent to acknowledge 
certain practical and epistemic limits. First, it is very unlikely that any commu-
nity of inquiry will come to universal agreement on what is true, especially in 
the value-thick area of politics. Some positions are falsifiable, but most debates 
are within the realm of the not-yet-determined-but-not-clearly-false. However, 
experimental inquiry is more likely to achieve consensus than other methods. In 
practice, the hope is not so much to attain popular consent to the one True policy, 
but to exclude those policies that are clearly rooted in falsehoods. Even if rigorous 
inquiry cannot state the Truth, it may establish falsity as a boundary condition 
for political authority. This more moderate aim still achieves the outcome of 
delegitimizing laws denying climate change.
 It is also very unlikely that the public will ever become an ideal community 
of inquiry, or closely approximate the scientific community of experts. There is 
truth to Lippmann’s claims that the public does not have the direct knowledge 
of the world, technical background, or simple time to be omnicompetent in all 
matters of public policy. That said, Dewey never claimed that they could. Rather, 
he argued that they could function as more than a mere plebiscite by providing 
information, proposing hypotheses, and generating feedback. Citizens may also 
question what constitutes expertise and can keep watch over unjustified exclusions 
from the process of inquiry. As argued above, non-experts can serve a valuable 
function, even if they are not within the scientific community of inquiry proper.
 Third, climate experts must resist the belief that scientific expertise is sufficient 
for the best policy outcomes. Reiner Grundmann and Nico Stehr have detailed the 
complex relationships between knowledge and policy in the climate debate. They 
emphasize that the “linear-rational” model, which holds that “if science produces 
true and valid knowledge, this can be used in the political process, where it pro-
duces the ‘right’ political decisions and effectively resolves politically motivated 
debates.”39 In analyzing the tumultuous climate debate and its contrast with the 
successful reduction of ozone-destroying chlorofluorocarbons, they expose the 
need for scientific advocacy while also criticizing the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change’s institutional biases and highlighting the many difficulties 
of changing public opinion and of resolving environmental problems through 
political means.40
 Lastly, as frequently occurs in discussions of democracy, problems are multi-
plied on the international level. Environmental concerns like climate change do 
not stop at the water’s edge. In Dewey’s account, communities of inquiry articu-
late themselves out of those who are aware that they share a common concern. 
If there are to be experimentally warranted policies to address climate change, 
they must be the result of an international community of inquiry. However, even 
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those  inquirers backed by international political organizations presently lack the 
resources to test hypotheses or to sanction those who would not recognize their 
political authority. Possession of truth alone does not result in political power. 
National interest holds sway. International objectors at the United States’ un-
willingness to sign the Kyoto Protocol charge that we seek to limit economic 
development in other nations while saddling them with the environmental con-
sequences of our economic success. China also claims that despite its enormous 
economic growth and even greater greenhouse gas emissions, it is not obliged to 
abide by the Kyoto Protocol. There is no real incentive for the people of one na-
tion to fear the effects of their policies on other peoples or on future generations.
 To conclude, though the pragmatist model of truth and inquiry may point a 
way to resolving the abstract, theoretical issue of reconciling the divided roots of 
democratic authority in both truth and the consent of the governed, this is only a 
beginning. There is the task of institutionalizing these insights on the domestic 
and international political levels, which is much more daunting. The abstract 
problem of harmonizing two competing grounds of democratic legitimacy is not 
complete until it has been made effective in remade habits, customs, and institu-
tions. Given the practical and epistemic limits of that task, there will inevitably 
be an element of the tragic. Political decisions will be made and debates like 
those over climate change will continue in the course of approaching an ideal 
democratic and experimental community.
University of New Hampshire
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